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Horse Syndicates as Securities
Under Blue Sky Laws
INTRODUCTION
Currently, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
some form of securities laws, each basically paralleling the fed-
eral securities acts of 19331 and 1934.2 Although the merits of
these state "blue sky laws" 3 are constantly debated, 4 neither
critics nor proponents can realistically deny the increased com-
plexity in business deals attributable to these laws.5 Basically, an
'15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. 1980).
2 Id. § 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. 1980).
Although the origin of this term of endearment is uncertain, Professors Loss
and Cowett, among others, cite the following historical passage:
The State of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific and rich in farming prod-
ucts, has a large proportion of agriculturists not versed in ordinary business
methods. The State was the hunting ground of promoters and fraudulent
enterprises; in fact their frauds became so barefaced that it was stated that
they would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple. Metonymically
they became known as blue sky merchants, and the legislation intended to
prevent their frauds was called Blue Sky Law.
Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L.T. 37 (1916).
4 For arguments generally favorable to blue sky laws, see Brainin and Davis, State
Regulation of the Sale of Securities: Some Comments, 14 Bus. LAW. 456 (1958-59);
Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
287 (1959-60); Warren, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities, 25 B.C.L. REv.
495 (1983-84); Wright, Correlation of State Blue Sky Laws and the Federal Securities
Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 258 (1941). For arguments critical of blue sky laws, see Arm-
strong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REv. 713 (1958); Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regu-
lation and the Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1447 (1968-69); Hill, Some
Comments on the Uniform Securities Act, 55 Nw. L. REv. 661 (1961); Millonzi,
Concurrent Regulation of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for Congressional Reap-
praisal, 49 VA. L. REv. 1483 (1963); Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business
Promotions, 1969 DUKE L.J. 273 (1969); Smith, State "Blue Sky" Laws and the Federal
Securities Acts, 34 MICH. L. REv. 1135 (1936).
"The 'blue sky' laws had come to have a special meaning-a meaning full
of complexities, surprises, unsuspected liabilities for transactions normal
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attorney involved with the sale of securities must examine the
blue sky laws of each state in which the security will be offered
to ascertain the state's pertinent registration requirements. If a
security is to be offered in thirty-two states, for example, thirty-
three separate analyses must be completed, because compliance
with federal laws is also required. 6 Of course, these registration
requirements will not even be reviewed until the attorney con-
cludes that the particular investment to be sold constitutes a
"security." '7 This determination alone involves a separate anal-
ysis of all applicable state and federal laws.
This Note examines the effects of state blue sky laws on the
use of syndicates in the horse industry. Specifically, the defini-
tions of a security are explored to determine whether horse
syndicates constitute securities under blue sky laws. Because few
state courts have actually examined horse syndicates, this Note
attempts to provide guidance concerning state securities defini-
tions by examining the federal interpretive influence on state
decisions in the past. Federal securities law and the status of
horse syndicates under that law are also analyzed. First, how-
and usual-in short, a crazy quilt of state regulations no longer significant
or meaningful in purpose, and usually stultifying in effect, or just plain
useless."
Armstrong, supra note 4, at 714-15.
Obviously, some of this confusion is attributable to the emergence of federal
securities laws and their expansion into fields previously occupied solely by blue sky
laws. This conflict resulted in, and continues to fuel, arguments concerning preemption
of state securities law by the federal laws. See generally Brainin & Davis, supra note 4,
at 457; Millonzi, supra note 4, at 1494-99; Warren, supra note 4, at 498-538; Wright,
supra note 4, at 260-83.
6 A 32-state offering is not unrealistic for syndicates in the horse industry. Due
to recent capital deficiencies, the use of public offerings and large partnerships in the
industry has proliferated. It is no longer unusual to encounter as many as one thousand
investors in a single financial scheme. See Heckmerman, Taking Stock of Shares, THE
BLOOD HORSE, at 256 (Jan. 14, 1984). Although syndicates typically involve a much
smaller group of investors, preparing such agreements may be quite burdensome. In
1958, Loss and Cowett wrote the following concerning this laborious process of preparing
blue sky memoranda:
To begin with, the process ... contemplates at least four weeks' time from
the date that [a] preliminary blue sky memorandum has been prepared.
Frequently that much time is not available to the blue sky attorney. And
even if the overall time pressures are not great, there may be time pressures
in a particular state.
Loss & CowTT, BLUE SKY LAW 122 (1958).
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) for the federal definition of security.
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ever, the basics of breeding and racing syndicates are discussed.
I. THE BASICS OF SYNDICATION IN THE HORSE INDUSTRY
A. The Stallion Syndicate
Stallion syndicates8 are designed primarily to alleviate costs,
risks and responsibilities for interested investors. Although inves-
tors in major stallion syndicates are often experienced breeders,
syndicate managers must be employed because each investor
owns only a "fractional interest ' 9 in the stallion. This interest
usually entitles each owner to breed one mare to the stallion per
year, although it also obligates the investor to pay a portion of
the stallion's maintenance expenses. A syndicate manager must
monitor breeding activity and ensure that the stallion receives
proper care.'" As illustrated below," the syndicate manager's
"efforts" (if he or she is also the syndicate promoter) are critical
in determining whether the agreement constitutes a security. If
the manager is assigned extensive responsibilities, which he often
is,12 then the potential for security status is increased.
B. The Racing Syndicate
While the structure of a racing syndicate 3 resembles that of
a breeding syndicate, 4 the purposes differ. Investors in the rac-
ing syndicate are concerned primarily with track performance,
For a more detailed discussion of stallion syndicates, see Campbell, Stallion
Syndicates as Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 1131 (1981-82). See also Note, Equine Syndication:
A Legal Overview, 62 KY. L.J. 1038 (1973-74).
" The term fractional interest is preferable to the word shares, because the United
States Supreme Court has indicated that even the characterization of such agreements
may affect the determination of whether a security exists. See Campbell, supra note 8,
at 1132 n.4 (citing United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850-51
(1975)).
Campbell, supra note 8, at 1132-33.
See notes 26-32 infra and accompanying text.
12 The manager is also sometimes responsible for promoting the stallion, providing
insurance and assisting investors who wish to sell breeding rights. See id.
" For a more detailed discussion of racing syndicates, see Campbell, Racing
Syndicates as Securities, 74 Ky. L.J. 691 (1985-86).
" "Each involves the joint ownership of a horse with a contract, the syndicate
agreement, that governs the rights and obligations of the joint owners ('co-owners')."
Id. at 692.
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rather than breeding performance. This inherent distinction gen-
erally requires that the racing syndicate manager be delegated
greater duties than a breeding syndicate manager. Many of the
decisions impacting on the racing performance of a horse must
be made quickly and regularly, so that involvement of the co-
owners would be impractical. 5 Individual investors in breeding
syndicates, on the other hand, typically have absolute control
over the critical investment performance decision: which mare
to breed to which stallion.
II. INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL SEcuRrriEs LAW
A. The Howey Test
Although recent cases have modified its holding, S.E.C. v. W.J.
Howey Co.'6 is the preeminent decision defining a security. The
Court held in Howey that an "investment contract" and, there-
fore a security, exists when "a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or third party."' 7 The Howey test is
commonly reduced to four elements: 1) an investment of money,
2) a common enterprise in which the money is invested, 3) an
expectation of profits, and 4) such expectation of profits to be
derived solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party.'
B. The Status of Howey at the Federal Level
Due to a great deal of criticism, subsequent decisions have
softened the fourth component of the Howey test. S.E.C. v.
15
[A]rrangement must be made regarding the control and supervision of the
horse's racing career. For practical reasons, it is difficult to involve all the
co-owners in the day-to-day decisions of a racing career. Decisions concern-
ing jockeys, racing schedules and veterinary care, for examples, must be made
expeditiously, and as a result, the syndicate agreement usually delegates respon-
sibility for the care of the horse and the supervision of the racing career to
the syndicate manager or to some other person or small group. The delega-
tion is typically broad, usually giving the syndicate manager essentially unfet-
tered control over the racing of the horse.
Id. at 692-93.
-6 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
,7 Id. at 298-99.
See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 8, at 1136-37.
[Vol. 74
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Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.'9 is the case most often cited as the
impetus for judicial variation from Howey. In Koscot, each
participant, after paying a fee, was allowed to earn commissions
by encouraging others to become representatives of Koscot. The
original investor was entitled to a portion of the fee that each
new participant paid.20 Because each original investor played a
significant role in the generation of profits, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals realized that application of a strict Howey
standard would preclude its classifying of the transaction as a
security.2' The court therefore modified at least the terminology
of the crucial fourth element: "The critical inquiry is 'whether
the efforts made by those other than the investor are the unde-
niably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise.' "22
,9 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
10 Id. at 475-76. Koscot illustrates the operation of what is commonly referred to
as a "pyramiding scheme." The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, using its expanded
Howey test, concluded that the transaction constituted a security. As the discussion in
this Note of state court decisions employing risk capital analysis explains, the same
conclusion is reached almost universally. These state courts profess to use a test unlike
the one used in Koscot, yet reach the same result, revealing the actual similarities of the
two tests.
2, The district court had relied upon the "solely" language of Howey in concluding
that the Koscot scheme did not constitute an investment contract. Id. at 477.
Id. at 483.
The critical language quoted in Koscot was taken from a 1973 case decided by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476,
482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973), investors contributed various sums of
money in exchange for the right to attend classes aimed at improving self-motivation
and sales ability. In addition, those investing in certain programs were allowed to sell
the course, which included tapes, records and other materials, to others. Id. at 478. A
sale of the course resulted in a commission for the investor. Id. at 479. In adopting the
"undeniably significant" test set out in Koscot, the court stated:
Our holding in this case represents no major attempt to redefine the
essential nature of a security. Nor does our holding represent any real
departure from the Supreme Court's definition of an investment contract
as set out in Howey. We hold only that the requirements that profits come
"solely" from the efforts of others would, in circumstances such as these,
lead to unrealistic results if applied dogmatically, and that a more flexible
approach is appropriate.
Id. at 483.
The Ninth Circuit, by analogy, made a persuasive argument that the "new" test
was in accord with the Supreme Court's intention in Howey. See id. at 482. "Let us
assume," the court hypothesized, "that in Howey ... the sales and service agreement
had provided that the buyer was to buy and plant the citrus trees." Id. at 482-83. In
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The federal courts apparently have accepted this expanded
interpretation of Howey.23 In fact, the United States Supreme
Court may have implicitly approved the expanded test in United
Housing Foundation v. Forman,24 in which the Court stated that
the "economic realities underlying a transaction" are the critical
considerations in analyzing alleged securities. 25
It is within these parameters that syndicate organizers must
operate. In structuring the duties of a syndicate manager/pro-
moter, the attorney must remember that an over-delegation of
duties will result in a security.
There is little case law interpreting horse syndicates under
federal securities laws, although one recent district court case
has addressed the issue. In Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc. ,26
the court examined a syndicate agreement assigning the manager
very few responsibilities. The agreement stated that the manager
"would do no more than furnish a list of breeders who had
inquired as to the availability of [breeding rights]." 27 While the
court primarily based its decision on the fact that the syndicate
Howey, the majority of the investors actually contracted with a Howey Company affiliate
to have all of the work conducted by this "third party." As the Ninth Circuit pointed
out, "[T]he essential nature of the scheme ... would be the same," even though the
investor was contributing some part of the services. Id. at 483. "He would still be
buying, in exchange for money, trees and planting, a share in what he hoped would be
the company's success in cultivating the trees and harvesting and marketing the crop."
Id. Thus, the court concluded, the Supreme Court would have held under those facts
that an investment contract existed. Id.
1 See Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651
F.2d 1174, 1185 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); Noa v. Key Futures,
Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1980); Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of America, Inc.,
608 F.2d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 915
(8th Cir. 1976); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692-93 (3d Cir. 1973).
This principle espoused in Koscot has been interpreted by some federal courts to
require an inquiry as to whether the investor has contributed risk capital subject to the
entrepreneurial or management efforts of others. See Great Western Bank and Trust v.
Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1256-58 (9th Cir. 1976). This should come as no surprise, because
some contribution of capital is necessary to constitute the sale of an investment security.
Furthermore, risk, in its most basic form, is an element of the Howey and Koscot tests:
if the investor exerted a great deal of effort, the risk would not rest upon the efforts of
a third party.
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
2 Id. at 850-51.
26 630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
27 Id. at 8.
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lacked the common enterprise requirement of Howey,28 the court
also noted that the manager's efforts did not approach the
threshhold required by Howey's fourth element. 29
Fortunately, this decision 'appears to be consistent with the
Security and Exchange Commission's (S.E.C.) position. "[T]he
Commission has uniformly taken the position that a share in a
stallion syndicate is not a security, provided the syndicate man-
ager does no more than care for the horse and perform certain
ministerial functions for the syndicate." 30
The reaction to racing syndicates may be different, however,
because of the greater duties generally delegated to the syndicate
manager3' and because of the other characteristics of typical
racing syndicates.3 2
Against this general background, this Note examines perti-
nent blue sky decisions. Since few cases have interpreted syndi-
cates, the following analysis proceeds on the premise that state
courts following federal interpretations in the past will continue
to do so. For example, assume that the high court of state "X"
has in the past relied upon federal decisions when interpreting
its blue sky law because of the similarities between state law and
federal law. It is logical to further assume that the court will
continue that practice when construing a syndicate agreement.
As illustrated above, such a method would probably result in a
23 Id. See Campbell, supra note 13, at 696.
29 630 F. Supp. at 8. There was evidence that the managers offered to sell the plain-
tiff's right to other breeders. The court, however, granted the defendant's summary judg-
ment despite this evidence. Id. at 9. Professor Campbell finds this conclusion promising:
Although Kefalas represents no major conceptual development in the
definition of a security, it is a significant application of traditional Howey
concepts, especially in light of the procedural setting of the case. The court's
willingness to grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment, even in the
face of plaintiffs' allegations concerning the syndicate manager's additional
undertakings, indicates that one may be able to assign the syndicate manager
duties and responsibilities beyond those presently sanctioned by the no-action
letters of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission"). More
specifically, the case reflects at least one court's opinion that promises by a
syndicate manager to sell nominations on behalf on the co-owners will not
necessarily create a security. All of this should provide some comfort to per-
sons who wish to expand the traditional responsibilities of the syndicate
manager.
Campbell, supra note 13, at 697-98.
" Campbell, supra note 8, at 1147 (emphasis added).
" See text accompanying note 15 supra.
31 Campbell, supra note 13, at 703-06.
1985-86]
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conclusion that breeding syndicates are not securities, although
racing syndicates are. A critical assumption in this synopsis,
however, is that the pertinent blue sky law parallels the federal
law. That assumption is tested in section three of this Note.
III. STATES ADOPTING THE FEDERAL STANDARD
Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have adopted
the Uniform Securities Act33 since its promulgation in 1956. 34
The section of the Act crucial to this Note is section 401(1), 31
" UNIF. SECURriEs ACT, 7B U.L.A. 576 (1985).
14 ALA. CODE §§ 8-6-1 to 8-6-33 (1975); ALAsKA STAT. § 45.55.010 et seq. (1980);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1235 to 67-1263 (1980); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 11-51-101 to 11-
51-129 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-470 to 36-502 ('West 1981); DEL. C. tit. 6
§§ 7301-28 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-2601 to 2-2618 (1981); HAWAn REv. STAT. §§
485-1 to 485-25 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 30-1401 et seq. (1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-
1-1 to 23-2-1-24 (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.101-.614 (1949 & Supp. 1935);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1252 to 17-1275 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.310-.550,
292.991 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981); MD. Cor's. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11.101-.805 (1933);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. I10A, §§ 101-417 (1985); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.501-
.818 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80A.01-.31 (West 1968); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-71-
101 to 75-71-735 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.101-.418 (Vernon 1967); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-10-101 to 30-10-308 (1985); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 8-1101 to 8-1124 (1983);
Na,. REv. STAT. §§ 90.010-.205 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-B:1 to 421-B:34
(1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:3-47 to 49:3-76 (West 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-13-
1 to 58-13-46 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78A-I to 78A-65 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71 §§ 101-502 (West 1965); OR. REv. STAT. § 59.005 et seq. (1985); PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1-101 to 1-704 (Purdon 1965); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 10 §§ 851-95 (1976); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to 35-1-1590 (Law. Co-op 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 to 61-1-
30 (1953 & Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-501 to 13.1-527.3 (1985); WAsH. REV. CODE
§§ 21.20.005 to 21.20.940 (1983); W. VA. CODE §§ 32-1-101 to 32-4418 (1982); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 551.01-.69 (,Vest 1969); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-4-101 to 17-4-129 (1977).
33
"Security" means any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evi-
dence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement; collateral-trust certificate; preorganization certificate or
subscription; transferable share; investment contract; voting-trust certifi-
cate; certificate of deposit for a security; certificate of interest of partici-
pation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in payments out of
production under such a title or lease; or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for guar-
antee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the
foregoing. "Security" does not include any insurance or endowment policy
or annuity contract under which an insurance company promises to pay [a
fixed sum of] money either in a lump sum or periodically for life or for
some other specified period.
UNIF. SEcuRIIEs ACT § 401(1) (1985).
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which includes the term "investment contract"-the definition
that the Howey Court relied upon36-in the definition of a
security.
Of those thirty-six jurisdictions adopting the Act, twenty-
three have retained this definition without any significant
changes.37 Furthermore, five states38 not adopting the Act have
enacted a substantially identical definition. Therefore, twenty-
eight states appear to be in the proper statutory position to rely
upon federal case law when interpreting agreements, because
those states' definition of a security is virtually identical to the
pertinent federal provisions.3 9
Otherwise, so far as horse syndications are concerned, Ohio,40
Pennsylvania4' and Texas42 contain perhaps the most dangerous
provisions defining securities. In addition to the basic language
contained in section 401(1) of the Uniform Securities Act, these
states specifically address syndicates. For example, section
1707.01(B) of the Ohio Act includes "syndicate certificates" in
the definition of a security. 3 Groby v. State,4 an early case
interpreting the term securities, determined that membership re-
ceipts in an oil syndicate were securities when profits and earn-
ings were anticipated from the property of the syndicate. 45
36 S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
"ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1247(1); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-102(12); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36-471(m); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2601(12); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 485-
1(12); IDAHO CODE § 36-1402(12); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k); IOWA CODE ANN. §
502.102(12); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12520); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.310(13); MD.
CoRPs. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 11-102; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I1IOA § 401; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80A.14(18); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-103(12); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1101(12);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §421-B:2(xx); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(m); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 78A-2(11); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.015(14)(a), (b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-20(12); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 61-1-13(12); VA. CODE § 13.1-5010); W. VA. CODE § 32-4-401(1).
" The five states are Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Maine and South Dakota.
19 See Securities Act of 1933, at § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1981); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, at § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1981).
• OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (1985).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 102(5) (1972).
41 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4 (Vernon 1964).
,' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B).
143 N.E. 126 (Ohio 1924).
Id. at 127-28. Although this is a broad interpretation, a later case implies that
at least some analysis of the investor's efforts in a syndicate agreement is required. See
State v. George, 362 N.E.2d 1223, 1228 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
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Other statutes that cause the greatest confusion are those
based upon the risk capital test, discussed in section four of this
Note.4 Statutes in Alaska,47 Georgia s4 8 Michigan 4 9 North Da-
kota,50 Oklahoma5  and Washington 52 specifically include risk
capital language. Although the Hawaii and California courts5 3
use the risk capital test in defining a security, neither state
statutorily embraces the language of the test.5 4
Of the twenty-eight jurisdictions adopting the Act's defini-
tion of security, courts in twenty-four jurisdictions have used
the general federal guidelines when interpreting the definition of
investment contract or security under blue sky laws. 5 This should
See notes 81-128 infra and accompanying text.
47 ALASKA STAT. § 45.55130(12).
48 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(16) (1982).
49 MICH. Com.sp. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(l).
. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(12) (1985).
" OKLA. STAT. tit. 71 § 2(20).
52 WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.005(12).
" See notes 94-128 infra and accompanying text.
' CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West 1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-1(12) (1968).
" The states closely following federal law include:
Alabama: See Burke v. State, 385 So. 2d 648 (Ala. 1980) (citing S.E.C. v. Koscot
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) and S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enter.,
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also Buffo v. State, 415
So. 2d 1158, 1162 (Ala. 1982) ("[Flederal cases should be reviewed to aid in the proper
interpretation of the corresponding sections of Alabama statutory law inasmuch as the
sections are virtually identical."); Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 213 So. 2d
841 (Ala. 1968) (adopting strict Howey standard), modified, Burke v. State, 385 So.2d
648 (Ala. 1980) (stating that investment contract shall be more broadly construed than
in Gallion).
Alaska: See American Gold and Diamond Corp. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 P.2d 1343
(Alaska 1984) (In determining whether "investment contracts" exist, substance and
economic reality prevail over form). See also Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241 (Alaska
1983) (reliance by investors on corporation's efforts was critical to finding of investment
contract); Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980) (gold mining scheme constitutes
investment contract under Howey).
Arizona: See Rose v. Dobras, 624 P.2d 887 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (lease of land
and sale of orchard trees accompanied by management contract constitutes a security
under Glenn W. Turner even though buyers had right to cancel management agreement).
Colorado: See People v. Milne, 690 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1984) (investment notes sold
by consumer finance corporation constitute "investment contracts" under Howey);
Lowery v. Ford Hill Inv. Co., 556 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1976) (condominium investment
agreement containing mandatory exclusive management and rental agreement constitutes
investment contract under Howey). See also Sauer v. Hays, 539 P.2d 1343 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1975) (sale of corporation's "distributorships" constitutes "investment contract"
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under "undeniably significant" test of Glenn W. Turner).
Connecticut: See State v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., 351 A.2d 879 (Conn. 1974)
(pyramiding scheme under which purchaser earned commission for selling advertisements
in corporate booklet deemed a security under Glenn W. Turner). See also State v.
Kreminski, 422 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1979) (defendant convicted for selling short-term notes
of financial services corporation because they constituted unregistered securities under
federal standards).
Florida: See notes 61-66 infra and accompanying text.
Illinois: See notes 67-78 infra and accompanying text.
Kansas: See State v. Colby, 646 P.2d 1071 (Kan. 1982) (agreement under which
corporation, after receiving initial investment, supplied distributor/purchaser with auto
parts for resale to public is not a security under fairly strict Howey/Forman test); State
v. Hodge, 460 P.2d 596 (Kan. 1969) (agreement under which defendant gave note for
twice the amount received from investor is a security under federal standards).
Kentucky: Scholarship Counselors, Inc. v. Waddle, 507 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. App.
1974) (sale for $175.00 of an interest is a "scholarship fund" held to be a security under
flexible Howey test). See also Securities Administrator v. College Assistance Plan (GVAM)
Inc., 700 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Waddle for support of application
of flexible Howey test to scholarship program).
Louisiana: Ek v. Nationwide Candy Div., Ltd., 403 So. 2d 780 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (investment in vending machines is an investment contract under Koscot "essential
managerial efforts" test even though plaintiff agreed to maintain the machines and keep
the business records).
Massachusetts: Valley Stream Teachers v. Comm'r. of Banks, 384 N.E.2d 200
(Mass. 1978) (lending agreements not securities under Howey and Great Western Bank
& Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976)).
Michigan: Dept. of Commerce v. DeBeers Diamond Inv., 280 N.W.2d 547 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1979) (sale of diamonds by defendant is not an investment contract under
Howey even though defendant guaranteed to repurchase any diamond sold to investors
at same price at which diamonds were selling on repurchase date). See also People v.
Dempster, 242 N.W.2d 381, 381 (Mich. 1976) ("The Uniform Securities Act carries
within itself the statement of its purpose, i.e. to 'make uniform the law of those states
which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this act with
the related federal regulation.' "). But see M.C.L.A. § 451.8010) (1979) (addition of
risk capital language to definition of security in state securities law).
Missouri: Garbo v. Hilleary Franchise Sys., 479 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972)
(investment in limited partnership in which general partner was to manage restaurant is
an investment contract under strict Howey standard). See also Carney v. Hanson Oil
Co., 690 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1985) (state securities laws not preempted by federal regu-
lations).
Montana: State v. Duncan, 593 P.2d 1026 (Mont. 1979) (investment is a security
under Glenn W. Turner where purchasers were sold materials to construct packages for
resale to defendant).
New Hampshire: See State v. Haneault, 431 A.2d 142 (N.H. 1981) (implying that
a "circle-of-gold" chain letter constitutes a security under Howey even though the express
language of the state statute constrained the court from so holding).
New Jersey: AMR Realty Co. v. State, 373 A.2d 1002 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977) (using Howey to illustrate that housing cooperative shares entitling purchaser only
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comfort promoters of, and investors in, horse syndicates, at
to lease of apartment did not constitute a security).
New Mexico: State v. Sheets, 610 P.2d 760 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing
Howey as appropriate test for an investment contract).
New York: See Gardner v. Leflkowitz, 412 N.Y.S.2d 740 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (sale of
diamonds for investment purposes is an investment contract under Howey).
North Dakota: See State v. Gates, 325 N.W.2d 166 (N.D. 1982) (loan commitments
are securities under guidance of federal cases); State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 924 (1982) (using federal cases in determining that no evil
intent is required to show willful violation of state securities law).
Pennsylvania: A.B.A. Auto Lease Corp. v. Adam Indus., 387 F. Supp. 531, 534
n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Section 1.2.201 of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission Rules
adopts a "significant managerial efforts" test.).
South Carolina: O'Quinn v. Beach Assoc., 249 S.E.2d 734 (S.C. 1978) (no invest-
ment contract exists where condominium manager merely offers rental services to pur-
chaser whose efforts were therefore greater than "nominal or insignificant").
Texas: See Searsy v. Commercial Trading Corp., 560 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1977)
(commodity options are securities under "undeniably significant" test of Glenn W.
Turner); Mayfield v. Troutman, 613 S.W.2d 339 (rex. Civ. App. 1981) (limited part-
nership with general partner performing managerial duties is an investment contract
under Howey and its progeny); Wilson v. Lee, 601 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)
(joint venture interests in raw land held solely for appreciation profit are not securities
under Howey and progeny); McConathy v. Dal Mac Commercial Real Estate, Inc., 545
S.W.2d 871 (rex. Civ. App. 1976) (joint venture interests in raw land held solely for
appreciation profit are not securities under Howey and progeny); Star Supply Co. v.
Jones, 665 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (transfer of company stock merely indicating
ownership of entire business is not a sale of securities under Howey-Forman); Cross v.
DFW South Entry Partnership, 629 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (sale of interest
in unimproved land is not a security where promoter merely managed daily activities
and purchaser retained ultimate control of investment and profits).
Utah: Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinley, 667 P.2d 15 (Utah 1983) (investor
contracts through which company generated capital to fund business of managing
payrolls for other businesses are investment contracts under Glenn W. Turner).
Vermont: Northern Terminals, Inc. v. Leno, 392 A.2d 419 (Vt. 1978) (security
cannot exist when plaintiffs' expectation of profits depended upon acquisition of new
facilities rather than entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others).
Washington: See McClellan v. Sundholm, 574 P.2d 371 (Wash. 1978) (investment
contract exists under Howey when investor in silver bars expects to derive profit from
seller's ability to wisely manage selection, purchase and resale activities). See also Sauve
v. K.C., Inc., 591 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1979) (transaction involving loan of capital in
return for promise of fixed interest payments and return of principal within three years
is a security under federal standards), reversing Sauve v. K.C., Inc., 577 P.2d 599 (1978)
(in which court of appeals incorrectly applied risk capital test and found no security);
State v. Markham, 697 P.2d 263, 269 n.6 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming use of
Howey while also noting addition of risk capital language to Washington securities law);
Christgard, Inc. v. Christensen, 627 P.2d 136 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (sale of interest in
sawmill is a security when investor depended on seller's knowledge, skills, managerial
expertise and marketing experience).
Wyoming: Gaudina v. Haberman, 644 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1982) (inter vivos trust
managed for investors is a security under Howey).
SYNDICATES UNDER BLUE SKY LAWS
least in breeding syndicates. 6 Although it is difficult to deter-
mine the amount of effort that the syndicate manager is allowed
to exert before the syndicate is ruled a security, at least concrete
guidelines are in place.
Marshall v. Harris57 decided in 1976 by the Oregon Supreme
Court, illustrates a state court's use of federal guidelines. In
Marshall, the defendants purchased from the plaintiffs a one-
third interest in the track earnings of two thoroughbreds. In
addition to the initial purchase price, the investor agreed to pay
for training, feeding and other maintenance expenses. The pro-
moter expressly retained the right of control over the care and
activities of the horses. Within a matter of months, the investor
terminated all payments, thus compelling the promoter to file a
law suit.5 8 The court had little trouble holding that the agreement
constituted an investment contract under Howey. 9 Because the
two horses had been shipped to California for training, it was
impossible for the investor to have any control whatsoever. 0 In
addition, the promoter contractually retained complete control
of the horses.
A Florida court reached a similar result in Brown v. Rai-
righ.61 In Brown the investor purchased a ten percent interest in
five horses for $11,675.00.62 The investor was to receive ten
percent of the horses' winnings, while the seller "was to retain
custody and control of the horses and undertake all the work
of training, caring for and racing them. ' 63 Although the court
" See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text.
" 555 P.2d 756 (Or. 1976).
Id. at 758.
Although the Oregon court applied federal standards in this case, Oregon is not
categorized as having "adopted" those guidelines because of several other Oregon cases
either considering or adopting risk capital analysis. See Pratt v. Kross, 555 P.2d 765
(Or. 1976) (risk capital test was noted as a viable option, but modified Howey test was
applied in holding that a limited partnership interest is an investment contract); Black
v. Corp. Div., 634 P.2d 1383 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (tax shelter investment scheme is a
security under both Howey and risk capital tests); State v. Consumer Business System,
Inc., 482 P.2d 549 (Or. Ct. App. 1971) (franchise agreements are securities under risk
capital test).
555 P.2d at 758.
6 363 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
12 Id. at 591.
6' Id.
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concluded that no security existed because there was no common
enterprise,6 it noted that the efforts requirement of the Howey
test had been satisfied because the investor was relying solely
upon the efforts of the promoter.6 - This decision is not surpris-
ing, even though the contract gave the investor the privilege of
selling his interest back to the promoter until the end of the
year. 6
A recent Illinois case provides a similar illustration of the
effects of federal standards in the analysis of breeding syndi-
cates. Although Ronnett v. American Breeding Herds, Inc.67
involved what is commonly known as a "cattle-care contract,"
the principles, and the facts, greatly resembled a stallion syndi-
cate.68 In that case, the investor, Ronnett, was advised by defend-
ant Shannon to invest in a cattle breeding operation offered by
defendant American Breeding Herds (ABH). In 1972, Ronnett
purchased thirty-six Charolais cows and a one-quarter interest
in a Charolais bull for a total of $113,000.00. Ronnett also
agreed to pay $80.00 per animal in quarterly maintenance fees.
The contract provided Ronnett with one breeding privilege for
each cow but the selection of the sire was reserved exclusively
to ABH. Although the contract entitled Ronnett to cancel the
maintenance program upon ninety days notice and to sell the
cattle publicly or privately, ABH retained "complete jurisdiction
and control of the animals." ' 70 That authority included exclusive
control over maintenance and feed for the animals and the choice
of the animals' location. Ronnett received status reports on the
animals' condition and personally inspected the herd and the
facilities."
I The court held that, under Howey, there could be no common enterprise with
only one investor. Id. at 593.
65 Id. The court also noted that the term "solely" had been modified in federal
cases. Id. at 592 n.3.
Id. at 591.
464 N.E.2d 1201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
See notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
464 N.E.2d at 1202. As in many of these cases, the investor in Ronnelt was
totally unfamiliar with cattle breeding. In fact, he was a physician advised to invest for
tax purposes.
7o Id.
I7 d.
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In June, 1977, after investing approximately $204,000.00 into
the venture, Ronnett ordered the cattle sold and received in
return a check for $7,016.27. Subsequently, he sought recision
of the contract and a refund of invested funds.72
As the court noted, the principal issue was whether the
transaction amounted to an investment contract subject to the
federal and state securities laws. 73 After finding that a common
enterprise existed due to a "vertical commonality," 74 the court
addressed the difficult efforts issue. Although the court acknowl-
edged Ronnett's authority in first delegating maintenance duties
to ABH and then in ordering the sale of the cattle, it determined
that an investment contract did exist. The control retained by
Ronnett was insufficient to vitiate the true nature of the contract:
Ronnett was permitted to observe his herd, and he commented
upon his satisfaction with the way things were going. Yet, he
could not have participated in the ... vital aspects of the
operation in terms of its potential for success since they were
within the sole control of ABH. 76
It may be significant that the court reached this conclusion even
though Ronnett had the right to order his cattle sold.77 The court
also emphasized that Ronnett had no expertise in breeding or
selling cattle, even though he was an experienced investor. 8
As indicated, state courts clearly adopting federal interpre-
tations for security analysis have provided critical groundwork
for parties interested in syndicate agreements. There are, how-
ever, three other categories of states in which the courts' posi-
tions are not as clear. One category contains states indicating in
some manner-either by dictum or by implication-that they at
least acknowledge federal interpretations; 79 another contains states
72 Id.
" Id. at 1203.
4 Id. at 1204.
11 Id. at 1206.
76 Id.
" The investment agreement provided, however, that ABH would decide "when,
how, where and for what price" the cattle would be sold. Id.
79 Id.
The following jurisdictions have accepted, at least directly or indirectly, general
federal guidelines. District of Columbia: See Price v. Griffin, 359 A.2d 582 (D.C. 1976)
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in which the courts have given no indication whatsoever of how
they interpret blue sky laws;80 and the final category, one that
is analyzed in section four of this Note, contains states basically
rejecting federal interpretations and applying instead some form
of risk capital analysis. It is demonstrated that the application
of the risk capital test is essentially identical to federal interpre-
tations under Koscot and its progeny. Because these state courts
apparently do not realize this similarity, however, they still pose
something of a risk to potential investors.
IV. STATES ADOPTING TE Risic CAPITAL TEST
Six states statutorily include risk capital language in their
definition of a security. In addition to those states, Hawaii and
California courts have analyzed various schemes under the risk
capital test.8'
The Washington rendition of the risk capital test is perhaps
the most simply stated, although its elements are virtually iden-
tical to the tests in Alaska, Michigan, North Dakota, and Okla-
homa. The Washington statute provides that a security includes
an "investment of money or other consideration in the risk
capital of a venture with the expectation of some valuable benefit
to the investor where the investor does not receive the right to
exercise practical and actual control over the managerial deci-
sions of the venture. ' 8 2 Michigan requires the contribution to
(using federal cases to interpret District of Columbia's equivalent of federal Rule lOb-
5). Indiana: Wisconics Engineering, Inc. v. Fisher, 466 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(tacitly accepting trial court's use of Forman to interpret state's definition of security).
Iowa: Midwest Management Corp. v. Stephens, 291 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1990) (generally
relying on federal cases in discussing state blue sky law). North Carolina: Commodities
Int'l, Inc. v. Eure, 207 S.E.2d 777, 780 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that blue sky
laws' similarity to 1933 Act "dictates our reliance on the decisions of the state and
federal courts in interpreting them.").
South Dakota's courts have interpreted the state's blue sky law without explaining
their rationale. See, e.g., Hofer v. General Discount Corp., 192 N.W.2d 718 (S.D.
1971).
. These states are Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
" See notes 46-54 supra and accompanying text.
2 VAsH. REv. CODE § 21.20.005(12) (1985).
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be "capital, other than services," '8 3 while Alaska, North Dakota
and Oklahoma specifically include the "investment of money or
money's worth including goods furnished [and]/or services per-
formed in the risk capital of a venture. . .. "81
Whether state courts constrained by statutory risk capital
language may still follow federal standards when interpreting
state securities laws is questionable. If the pattern of blue sky
interpretation and legislation in Georgia is any indication, the
answer is "probably not." Section 10-5-2(16) of the Georgia
Code currently provides that an investment contract and, there-
fore, a security, exists when an investment
holds out the possibility of return of risk capital even though
the investor's efforts are necessary to receive such return if:
(A) Such return is dependent upon essential managerial or
sales efforts of the issuer or its affiliates; and
(B) One of the inducements to invest is the promise of pro-
motional or sales efforts of the issuer or its affiliates in the
investor's behalf; and
(C) The investor shall thereby acquire the right to earn a
commission or other compensation from sales of rights to sell
goods, services, or other investment contracts of the issuer or
its affiliates."5
This legislation, particularly section 10-5-2(16)(C), clearly re-
sulted from criticism of the Georgia Supreme Court's decision
in Georgia Market Centers, Inc. v. Fortson.8 6 In Georgia Market
Centers, investors (called Founder Distributors or Founder Su-
pervisors) paid a stated sum in return for the right to* participate
in a marketing program.87 Each investor was given a number of
plastic purchase authority cards to distribute to his contacts; the
cards entitled holders to shop at the Market Center. Each time
a cardholder made a purchase, the investor received a commis-
' MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(1) (1967).
ALAsKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(12) (1985);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 71 § 2(20) (1965).
" GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(16) (1982).
171 S.E.2d 620 (Ga. 1969).
" Id. at 621-22.
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sion based upon the size of his original investment. 8s The Georgia
court, applying Howey while also emphasizing the economic
realities of the transaction, held that no security existed.
No share is sold in the stock of the [Market Centers] corpo-
rations and there is no participation in the profits of the ...
corporations. While the efforts of the [Market Centers] are
necessary in establishing the centers and selling the merchandise
in order that there may be any return to the Founder [investor],
no commission is earned by the Founder [investor] except from
sales to customers obtained, directly or indirectly, by him.89
That language juxtaposed beside section 10-5-2(15)(C) clearly
belies the legislative impetus for adopting the risk capital test in
1974. The test employed by the court appears overly restrictive
when compared with modern federal standards. Nevertheless,
the legislature's hyperactive attitude was unnecessary in light of
federal decisions between the time Georgia Market Centers was
decided in 1969 and section 10-5-2(16) was enacted in 1974. For
example, S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner,90 decided in 1973, inter-
preted such pyramiding schemes as constituting securities. Fur-
thermore, the new legislation compelled the Georgia courts to
consider risk capital in subsequent decisions. 9' Most courts have
found their own way to the expanded federal standards without
such legislative tampering.
The difficult aspect of analyzing risk capital states is deter-
mining exactly what risk capital analysis entails. Many authors
have tried to explain the distinction between this test and the
prominent federal standard, 92 although none of the arguments is
particularly persuasive. This may be because the two tests are,
in fact, identical. To state it indelicately, these courts generally
find that capital is at risk when the promoter or third party
retains control over the use of the capital-when he is responsible
for the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts93 and the investor
exerts no effort.
'" Id. at 622.
I9 d. at 623-24.
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
See Dunwoody Country Club of Atlanta v. Fortson, 253 S.E.2d 700 (Ga. 1979).
See, e.g., Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security:" Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REv. 367 (1967).
91 See notes 19-25 supra and accompanying text.
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This efforts analysis, if accepted in all fifty states, would
provide the analytical framework presently found in the federal
courts. Some criteria must be universally accepted so that syn-
dicators and investors, without trepidation, can structure syndi-
cate agreements. Such an agreement, if the syndicator wishes to
avoid security classification, should carefully follow federal
guidelines in limiting the syndicate manager's duties.
The case most often cited as the genesis of the risk capital
test is Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobeiski.94 It may be argued,
however, that State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.,9- decided in
1920 by the Minnesota Supreme Court, actually provides the
neck around which this albatross may be hung.
In Gopher Tire, a case involving the sale of certificates
entitling purchasers to a commission on the sale of tires, the
court stated:
No case has been called to our attention defining the term
"investment contract:" The placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profits from its
employment is an investment as the word is commonly used
oand understood. If the defendant issued and sold its certifi-
cates to purchasers who paid their money, justly expecting to
receive an income or profits from the investment, it would
seem that the statute should apply.96
The principal difference between this test and the Howey test is
the absence of any concern by the Minnesota court over efforts. 97
In Gopher Tire, the purchased certificates "recite that defendant
[promoter] has appointed the holder (purchaser) as one of his
agents to assist by word of mouth and in other ways in the sale
of tires and tubes which defendant will manufacture. '" 98 In return
the agent received ten percent of the profit from tires and tubes
sold at his location. 99 Thus, it is obvious that the agent's efforts
were quite important in the production of his expected return.
13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Cal. 1961).
177 N.W. 937 (Minn. 1920).
Id. at 938.
' For a discussion of Howey and other federal cases, see notes 16-25 supra and
accompanying text.
177 N.W. at 937.
SId.
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In fact, the circumstances presented in Gopher Tire are similar
to those in S.E.C. v. Koscot'00 and other federal cases responsible
for expanding the Howey test. Those cases, however, employed
an efforts analysis not developed in 1920 when Gopher Tire was
decided. The Minnesota Supreme Court has employed Howey's
standard at least once since Gopher Tire was decided,' 0' although
the court has more recently pledged its allegiance to Gopher
Tire.0 2 Arkansas has adopted this same approach, expressly
rejecting the federal interpretations'0 3, and any efforts analysis.
This approach may be because the agreement under scrutiny in
the Arkansas case required no efforts to be exerted by the
investor.'0o
The lack of any effort analysis is also evident in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's Silver Hills opinion. Silver Hills involved
the sale of memberships in a country club developed by a group
of businessmen. After making a downpayment on the buildings
and land to be developed, the partners financed necessary im-
provements by selling "charter memberships" for $150.00 each.
Members were entitled to use the club's facilities, except the golf
course for which special memberships were required. The mem-
berships did not grant to the holder any rights in the income or
assets of the club. After 110 of these charter memberships were
sold, the state commissioner of corporations issued a desist and
restrain order, having concluded that the memberships were
unregistered securities under California's corporate securities act.
The developers sought a writ of mandamus to compel the com-
missioner to vacate his order. The superior court granted the
writ, and the Commissioner appealed to the California Supreme
Court.0 5
,"' 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text.
101 See State v. Investors Security Corp., 209 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 1973).
,02 See State v. Coin Wholesalers, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 583 (Minn. 1976) (sale of silver
coin investments constitutes sale of investment contract).
"0I Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 4 (Ark. 1977) (joint venture
interests in apartment complex are securities under the Gopher approach).
'o' The court noted that "[t]he investors were strictly passive investors who were
buying an interest in a tax shelter with apparently a long-term hope of realizing capital
gains on their investments." Id. at 11.
1o1 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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The court's analysis focused primarily upon the rights granted
to members under the membership application and the corporate
by-laws. The court noted:
The purchaser of a membership in the present case has a
contractual right to use the club facilities that cannot be re-
voked except for his own misbehavior or failure to pay dues.
Such an irrevocable right qualifies as a beneficial interest in
title to property within the literal language of subsection (a)
of Section 25008.106
This emphasis on a beneficial interest in title to property al-
lowed-or caused-the court to avoid the efforts issue. Further-
more, it facilitated the court's holding that such memberships
were securities even though there was no expectation of any
material benefits. 0 7 "[lt seems . . . clear that [the Act's] objec-
tive is to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance
of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not
they expect a return on their capital in one form or another.' 0 8
The court's analysis exposes the infirmities created by the
Silver Hills decision and its subsequent application. Because the
court focused upon a beneficial interest in title to property, the
efforts and profits analyses required in investment contract anal-
ysis are absent. The beneficial interest in property was created
by mere investment of funds and required the investor to exert
no efforts. Perhaps the court believed that the efforts issue was
trivial. Although obscure at first, the distinction between an
investment contract analysis and a beneficial interest in property
'- Id. at 188. When Silver Hills was decided, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008 (West
1960) read as follows:
'Security' includes all of the following:
(a) Any stock, including treasury stock; any certificate of interest or
participation; any certificate of interest in a profit sharing agreement, any
certificate of interest in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease; any transferable
share, investment contract, or beneficial interest in title to property, profits,
or earnings.
(b) Any bond; any debenture; any collateral trust certificate; any
note; any evidence of indebtedness, whether interest bearing or not.
(c) Any guarantee of a security.
(d) Any certificate of deposit for a security.
- 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
- Id. at 188-89.
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analysis becomes critical when the effects of Silver Hills are
recognized. The decision has been misapplied in the past, and
the potential for future error remains because some courts con-
tinue to rely upon Silver Hills in analyzing investment contracts.
The use of "effort" analysis, although neglected by Silver
Hills, was well-founded in California law. For example, in Hol-
lywood State Bank v. Wilde,'19 decided in 1945, a district court
of appeal held that securities-laws apply to the sale of chinchillas
when the purchasers are led to believe that the sellers will "by
their own efforts make the investments safe without the appli-
cation of effort by the investors...."1,0
California courts since Silver Hills have conducted an efforts
analysis even though they purport to adopt the risk capital
approach. In Sarmento v. Arbax Packing Co.,"' decided four
years after Silver Hills, Arbax was engaged in the business of
packing and shipping cherry and grape crops." 2 In 1961, Arbax
sold eighty acres of Tokay grapes to the plaintiff for $25,000.00.
The sales contract contained an agreement under which Arbax
promised to care for the crop at its own expense until harvest.
At harvest time, the plaintiffs/purchasers would harvest the crop
at their expense. A second contract provided that Arbax would
market the crop at its normal rate of commission. Before har-
vest, however, heavy rains damaged the crop, resulting in a loss
to the purchasers of $7,069.84. The purchasers filed suit against
Arbax alleging that the transaction constituted an unregistered
security. "13
The court, citing Silver Hills, stated that the broad definition
of a security in the California statutes "is designed to embrace
speculative schemes to attract risk capital .... 1"'4 In a departure
from Silver Hills, however, the court focused immediately upon
the elements of control and effort exerted by the parties. The
court concluded that this transaction did not constitute a secu-
rity, because, the court emphasized, the purchasers had exercised
,0) 160 P.2d 846 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945).
Id. at 847.
41 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
12 Id. at 869.
Id. at 870.
114 Id.
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a considerable amount of control and had not depended on "the
skill and managerial ability of Arbax" for their profit."'5 That
statement provides the two elements missing from Silver Hills-
control (or efforts) and profit. It also makes abundantly clear
that the court, unwittingly or not, applied Howey. Risk capital
rhetoric cannot obscure that conclusion.
In People v. Witzerman,"'6 decided in 1972, another Califor-
nia court of appeal examined "cattle care contracts" under the
state securities laws. The transaction involved an investment of
$500.00 or $600.00 in return for a cow and a calf to be raised
on the Saddle Butte Ranch. The proceeds from the annual sale
of each calf crop were to be divided over a six-year period
between the purchaser and the owner of the ranch. 1 7 The court
had little trouble determining that the contracts were securities.
In so holding, the court further exposed the interconnection
between the risk capital and efforts analyses:
[T]he purchasers of the cattle care contracts were merely pas-
sive investors providing risk capital for the operation of the
Saddle Butte Ranch in Oregon. They placed their cows and
calves under the exclusive care and control of Forslind and
they depended completely upon his skill and expertise in the
production and marketing of their cattle for any return on
their investment." '8
Again, the critical elements of the Howey test are evident in the
court's opinion." '9
M, Id. at 871. The facts in this case are similar to the facts in Howey; although in
Howey, the investors exerted practically no efforts. It is therefore no surprise that the
California Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as did the Howey Court.
1' 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
Id. at 287.
"' Id. at 290. See notes 67-78 supra and accompanying text for a similar conclusion
regarding cattle care contracts under federal standards.
,," In response to the preceding discussion, one might argue either that the Silver
Hills opinion implicitly addressed the efforts issue or that the conclusion was so self-
evident in the facts that it did not require discussion. To advance such an argument,
however, is to assert that the entire "dispute" between risk capital and the Howey
progeny is nonexistent. Such an argument is easily controverted.
No better case exists to prove this point than People v. Graham, 210 Cal. Rptr.
318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of
California. Defendant Graham was convicted of selling an unqualified security to a
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The Hawaii Supreme Court recognized the conceptual prob-
lem in the Silver Hills risk capital test and expressly added an
efforts analysis. That court's risk capital test provides that an
investment contract exists whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of
the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offer-
or's promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and
above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of
the operation of the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical
and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enter-
prise. 2
0
purchaser working undercover for the district attorney. The transaction involved, basi-
cally, the sale of an interest in a limited partnership formed to promote a fluke invention.
Id. at 322.
The defendant urged the court to adopt the Howey test and to apply a strict
interpretation of the "solely" requirement. Such an analysis might have benefitted the
defendant because the partnership agreement anticipated that the investor would heavily
promote the invention. Id. at 321. Such an analysis may also have shocked the state's
attorney given the high degree of acceptance of the risk capital test in California. The
defendant was not advancing a spurious defense, however, and cited a 1979 California
case adopting federal standards. Id. at 327 (citing People v. Park, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978)). Rather than arguing for a risk capital analysis, the state in
response argued that the "solely" language of Howey should be rejected in favor of an
"essential managerial efforts test." 210 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
The opinion states: "Both parties ignore the fact that the Howey test, whether
modified or not, may well not be the means by which a 'security' is defined in
California." Id. at 323. Although the opinion is somewhat confusing, it is clear that the
court interpreted the interest to be a security because the efforts exerted by the investor
were not "those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise." Id. at 325. By way of a footnote to this conclusion that the risk capital
and Howey analyses merged, the court declared that it need not decide "whether the
Silver Hills risk capital analysis is the exclusive definition of a security in California or
whether the ... tests are complementary and alternative." Id. at 325 "n.12. The effects
of Silver Hills are clear. Although the court reached the proper conclusion by applying
the expanded Howey test, it was compelled to credit Silver Hills with an element it
simply did not address-the efforts of the investor. This decision clearly illustrates the
confusion still generated by Silver Hills.
"I State v. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Hawaii 1971).
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The court stated in its development of the "new" test that the
Howey test's narrow concept of investor participation had led
courts to engage "in polemics over the meaning of the word
'solely.' ",,2' Such entrapment results in a failure to consider
whether investors who participate to a limited degree in the
operation of the business should be protected.'2 As emphasized
throughout this Note, however, that element of the Howey test
has been modified and corresponds closely to the language in
subsection four of the Hawaii test.12 Furthermore, the modified
risk capital test parallels the Howey-type analysis in that it avoids
the myopic view taken by Silver Hills. By including the provision
regarding efforts, the test illustrates that the Silver Hills court
was engaged in polemics regarding risk capital, thereby ignoring
the efforts issue. It should now be clear that the two tests are
the same.
This conclusion is illustrated by the case that spawned the
Hawaii risk capital test, State v. Hawaii Market Centers, Inc.' 24
In that case, Hawaii Market Center (HMC) intended to open a
retail store that would sell merchandise only to persons possess-
ing purchase authorization cards. HMC raised initial capital and
distributed the first memberships by recruiting "founder-mem-
bers." For $320.00, these founder-members were given a sewing
machine or cookware set and an agreement with the corporation
called a "Founder-Member Purchasing Contract Agreement."
That agreement specified five ways the founder-members could
earn commissions from the corporation; each related in some
way to the distribution of membership cards or the induction of
a new member into the corporation.'1
Eventually, the state commissioner of securities filed suit
against HMC, alleging that the meniberships constituted securi-
ties. The trial court supported the commissioner, holding that
the agreements were investment contracts. The Hawaii Supreme
Court affirmed, using its new risk capital test. 2 6 The circum-
" Id. at 108.
1 I d.
"-" See notes 16-25 supra and accompanying text.
'" 485 P.2d at 105.
Id. at 107.
' Id.
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stances recited above should create a sense of deja vu because
the facts are virtually identical to those in S.E.C. v. Koscot,27
and S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner, 21 two of the principal cases in
the development of the "new" federal standard. Applying the
expanded Howey test, both of those courts held that such agree-
ments were investment contracts. Those holdings support the
theory that the federal standard and the "Hawaiian" risk capital
test are identical.
CONCLUSION
This Note, while indicating which states interpret blue sky
laws under federal guidelines, has also implicitly revealed at least
one area of confusion created by a dual system of securities
regulation. Though one set of states argues that it applies an
analysis differing from the federal test, this Note argues that the
tests are identical.
Whether or not the reader accepts that argument or appre-
ciates the ramifications, it should at least be clear that the
ambiguities fueling the argument are an unnecessary impediment
to business transactions. Without a doubt, the threat of civil
and/or criminal sanctions deters prospective investors from en-
gaging in business transactions.
It should be realized that cooperation-either judicial or
legislative-is needed in order to supply the uniformity between
state and federal securities laws. Until this uniformity is ob-
tained, inconsistent judicial decisions and unnecessary investor
trepidation will continue.
John Coleman Ayers
" 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See notes 18-25 supra
and accompanying text.
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